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Few constitutional issues have so consistently held the at-
tention of scholars and politicians over the last thirty years as
the distribution of war powers between Congress and the Presi-
dent. While the Vietnam War and the War Powers Resolution
provided the initial sparks,1 Presidents since then have been
more than forthcoming in offering new fuel for the war powers
debate, particularly President Reagan.2 Not only have presidents
carried out acts one could consider "war," such as invading Gre-
nada, Panama, or Iraq, but they also have assisted groups seek-
ing to topple foreign governments, such as Nicaragua's, often
without notifying, much less receiving permission from, Con-
gress. These "little wars" and covert actions have ignited yet an-
other flame of the post-Vietnam debate.' Several scholars, led by
Professors Charles Lofgren and Jules Lobel, have turned to the
long-neglected power of Congress to grant letters of marque and
reprisal4 to support congressional authority over all military ac-
tions short of declared war.
t B.A. 1994, Middlebury College; J.D. Candidate 1998, The University of Chicago.
I See Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 Wm & Mary L Rev 723, 737 n 31 (1996)
(Before Vietnam War, "there was little ... scholarly commentary" on war powers. War
was a "turning point" in academic discussion of issue.).
2 See, for example, David Locke Hall, The Reagan Wars: A Constitutional Perspective
on War Powers and the Presidency 135-269 (Westview 1991) (considering action in Leba-
non, invasion of Grenada, bombing of Libya, and escorting of Kuwaiti shipping during the
Iran-Iraq war); Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, "Covert" Paramilitary Action and
War Powers, in Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, eds, The U.S. Constitution and
the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives 149, 156 (Greenwood 1994)
(evaluating Reagan Administration's actions in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola).
' See Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U Miami L Rev 61, 61 (1995)
(defining "little wars" as "small military interventions and quick strikes, such as the Lib-
yan bombing, the Grenada and Panama invasions, and the recent bloodless invasion of
Haiti"); Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U Pa L Rev 1035, 1039-41 (1986) (arguing for congressional control over use of
"proxy armies" and other forms of "CIA paramilitary operations against foreign govern-
ments," such as those used in Nicaragua). An alternate term for "little war" is "low-
intensity conflict." Mark T. Uyeda, Note, Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution
to Deploy U.S. Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 Duke L J 777, 777 (1995).
' US Cost, Art I, § 8, cl 11.
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A proper understanding of letters of marque and reprisal,
derived from closely examining their use in the American Revo-
lution, shows that these scholars are overreaching. Letters of
marque and reprisal were government authorizations to private
shipowners to seize property of foreign parties, usually ships or
property from ships. An essential feature of letters of marque
and reprisal was the financial independence of those holding
them-a critical characteristic in light of the importance of Con-
gress's power of the purse, and one that is absent from the mod-
ern examples provided by the scholars who appeal to the Marque
and Reprisal Clause as a basis for vast congressional authority.
The Clause acquires modern relevance, if at all, only when the
executive fights independently of Congress's power of the purse.
Part I of this Comment surveys the increasing scholarly at-
tention to the Marque and Reprisal Clause, emphasizing the
work of Lofgren and Lobel. Part II first lays out the law that gov-
erned those enterprising Americans who received letters of
marque and reprisal during the Revolution. It then explains the
three historical characteristics that created those Americans' fi-
nancial independence, making special treatment in the Constitu-
tion necessary: the focus on commercial rather than military ex-
ploits, the absence of governmental support, and the lack of gov-
ernmental supervision except for the prize courts, which not only
supervised them, but also granted the law-abiding title to (and
thus the critical income from) the ships and other property they
seized. Part III, emphasizing the relationship between Congress's
power of the purse and these financial aspects, applies Part II to
show how the recent interpretations of the Marque and Reprisal
Clause rest upon mistaken analogies.
I. THE REVIVAL OF THE MARQUE AND REPRISAL CLAUSE
While it might appear that the Marque and Reprisal Clause
belongs in the dustbin of history where it has rested for over a
century and a half, such an appearance would be deceiving. Al-
though the United States has not issued letters of marque and
reprisal since the War of 1812' and has not considered doing so
since Andrew Jackson's presidency,6 and although an interna-
tional treaty has banned them since 1856,' a growing group of
' Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 3). The Confederacy, however, relied
on them during the Civil War. Id; Fritz Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace: A Study in
Law, History, and Politics 239 (Yale 1949).
6 See Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 163-64 (Kansas 1995); Grob, Relativity of
War and Peace at 239 (cited in note 5).
' This was the Declaration of Paris. The United States did not ratify it, but has
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scholars invokes the Clause to open a new front in the ongoing
battle over war powers. They argue that the President must gain
congressional approval before initiating any military actions, ex-
cept in extreme emergencies. This requirement results from a
convenient synergy between Congress's powers under the
Marque and Reprisal Clause and the Declare War Clause:8 the
former covers all little wars, and the latter covers the big ones, so
they claim.
In 1972 Charles Lofgren made the first serious effort to ap-
ply the Marque and Reprisal Clause to the modern debate.9 Lof-
gren largely builds his argument on various treatises of the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries,'0 although he concedes that
knowledge of them "was sometimes superficial" in the framing
period." The treatise-writers distinguished between "perfect"
war, which was declared, and "imperfect" war, which was not de-
clared and which was closely associated with reprisals. 2 States
could authorize specific reprisals, in which private parties seized
the property of a foreigner to redress some specific private injury,
and general reprisals, in which a state either used its own forces
or authorized private parties to vindicate some national indigna-
tion. 3
Lofgren notes that the uses, and therefore the meaning, of
letters of marque and reprisal had changed over the centuries
largely upheld its ban on privateering. Edgar Stanton Maclay, A History of American Pri-
vateers xxiii (Appleton 1899).
' Art I, § 8, cl 11 of the Constitution grants Congress power "[tro declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Wa-
ter."
Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understand-
ing, 81 Yale L J 672 (1972). Lofgren laments that "recent students of the war-making is-
sue" have neglected the Marque and Reprisal Clause. Id at 680 n 28.
" Id at 689-94, citing, among others, Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace
(1625); Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758); and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui,
The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (1752). See also W. Taylor Reveley II, War
Powers of the President and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? 54-55
(Virginia 1981) (briefly noting both the theorists and history through end of French and
Indian War).
" Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 689 n 74 (cited in note 9).
12 Id at 692-93.
"Id at 693. Other scholars disagree with Lofgren's suggestion that all reprisals fall
within the phrase "letter of marque and reprisal." Compare id at 696 ("The [Clause] [ ]
could easily have been interpreted... as a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress the
power of general reprisal outside the context of declared war."), with Francis D. Wormuth
and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History
and Law 37 (SMU 1986) ("Ihe only form of reprisal assigned to Congress by the Consti-
tution is the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal."). See also John C. Yoo, The Con-
tinuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal
L Rev 167, 250-51 (1996) (Clause "does not appear" to cover "all forms of imperfect war.").
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and were still changing at the time of the Founding.14 By the first
half of the 1700s, specific reprisals had "virtually disappeared"
and would have been considered "outmoded" by the time of the
Founding, while general reprisals, whether by public or private
forces, continued. 5 Lofgren tentatively concludes that the most
likely understanding at the Founding was that the Clause
granted Congress "whatever war-commencing power was not
covered by the phrase 'to declare war.""' 6 Putting the two clauses
together, it follows that Congress holds "nearly complete author-
ity over the commencement of war."1
The leading current advocate of applying the Marque and
Reprisal Clause to all modern military actions short of declared
war is Jules Lobel." In urging a "modern day analogy," he em-
phasizes covert actions, proclaiming that "the covert action of to-
day is the marque and reprisal of yesterday."9 Both, he claims,
involve private rather than public individuals and forces, and
both involve "hostilities against other nations," usually when no
declared war exists. By "covert action," he generally means any
action in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) finances,
" Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 693-97 (cited in note 9). See also Grob, Relativity of War and
Peace at 238-39 (cited in note 5) (noting that while Founding is obscure on letters of
marque and reprisal, practice suggests the proper meaning).
Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 693-94 (cited in note 9). For a survey of privateering and
letters of marque and reprisal from the time of King John to the Revolutionary War, see
Gardner Weld Allen, Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution 3-63 (Mass Hist Socy
1927). On the decline in the 1600s of reprisals for private claims, see id at 9. For an ac-
count of American privateering before the Revolutionary War, see id at 9-13, and John
Franklin Jameson, Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents
(Macmillan 1923).
Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 697 (cited in note 9).
17 Id at 700.
"Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev 1035 (cited in note 3). Many commentators in addition to
Lobel and Lofgren advocate a strong Marque and Reprisal Clause, most of them relying
on one of these two authors, or both. See, for example, Reveley, War Powers at 54-55, 63-
64 (cited in note 10); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional
Power 23, 37 (Penn State 1982); Mark J. Yost, Note, Self Defense or Presidential Pretext:
The Constitutionality of Unilateral Preemptive Military Action, 78 Georgetown L J 415,
423 (1989); Fisher, Presidential War Power at 162, 3, 17-20 (cited in note 6); Peter Raven-
Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in Stern and Halperin, eds, Power
to Go to War 29, 30-31 (cited in note 2); Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, Introduc-
tion, in Stern and Halperin, eds, Power to Go to War 1, 7 (cited in note 2).
19 Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1051, 1041 (cited in note 3).
Id at 1051. Lobel more recently extended this comparison, arguing that the Marque
and Reprisal Clause also requires congressional authorization for "small military inter-
ventions and quick strikes, such as the Libyan bombing, the Grenada and Panama inva-




trains, organizes, or leads foreign military groups, usually to un-
dermine a disliked government or to attack terrorists.2
Lobel defines "letters of marque and reprisal" loosely rather
than technically, and uses this loose definition to justify his
broad claims. Although he views the phrase as effectively con-
fined by the time of the Founding to general letters issued to pri-
vate parties-a view which is common (and correct)22-- he never-
theless argues that at that time the phrase included "any inter-
mediate or low-intensity hostility short of declared war."' It
meant "authorizations usually given to private merchantmen to
go out and fight the enemy."'
These scholars' arguments25 hinge on the original meaning
and history of the Marque and Reprisal Clause, yet they omit the
most important ingredient of that meaning and history. None of
the commentators considers the use of letters of marque and re-
prisal in the period with which the Framers would have been
most familiar-the American Revolution.2" The Founding itself
21 Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1036 n 9 (cited in note 3).
See Keynes, Undeclared War at 23 (cited in note 18); Abraham D. Sofaer, War, For-
eign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins 271 (Ballinger 1975); Fisher, Presi-
dential War Power at 162 (cited in note 6). See also John Hart Ely, War and Responsibil-
ity: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath 66-67 (Princeton 1993). Part II
explains the various private aspects of those who had letters of marque and reprisal.
Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 3). Lobel adds that while some writers
drew a distinction between letters of marque and letters of marque and reprisal based on
whether they were issued in war or peace, and while letters of marque were often distin-
guished from privateer commissions, treaties of the time tended to refer only generally to
"private armed vessels." Id at 1045 n 49.
" Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 67 (cited in note 3). As Lobel defines them, letters of
marque authorized trading vessels to arm themselves and "attack ships of foreign nations
during peace or war," while privateers were armed private vessels authorized by their
commissions "to fight in place of or alongside public naval vessels." Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev
at 1044 (cited in note 3). As Part H explains, however, it is imprecise to use the words
"attack" and "fight," since the goal was to seize goods and make a profit rather than to
make war. The claim that privateers fought "in place of or alongside public naval vessels"
becomes a lament when one examines practices and attitudes in the American Revolu-
tion.
A few scholars have weighed the above arguments and found them wanting. See
Marshall Silverberg, The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA's Covert Opera-
tions, 68 Tex L Rev 575, 581 (1990); Hall, The Reagan Wars at 19 (cited in note 2). The
most serious response comes from John Yoo. See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 167 (cited in note
13). But his originalist argument for executive initiative and congressional checks via the
power of the purse covers war powers broadly and devotes only brief attention to letters
of marque and reprisal and none to their use in the Revolution. Id at 250-52.
Lobel merely states that "[l]etters of marque were issued during the American
Revolution," 134 U Pa L Rev at 1044 (cited in note 3), and briefly discusses the Articles of
Confederation, id at 1059. Lofgren notes that the "precise interpretation of the scope of
the power" in the time of the Founding depended on "how [Americans in 1787-88] under-
stood the purpose of letters of marque and reprisal," 81 Yale L J at 679-80 (cited in note
9), but he does not discuss how the Revolution affected or revealed that understanding,
see id at 693.
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receives sparse attention, but this is for the understandable rea-
son that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution gave the
Marque and Reprisal Clause sparse attention.2 ' This sparseness
makes historical practice more important for evaluating Lobel's
"modern day analogy." The next Part unearths that history.
II. LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
While current scholars claim that the Marque and Reprisal
Clause grants Congress wide war powers, practice during the
American Revolution tells a different, more restrained, story. It
reveals that letters of marque and reprisal were privately fi-
nanced, governmentally authorized means of commercial warfare
conducted for profit and supervised only after-the-fact. They were
not government tools for conquest, revolution, or general may-
hem.
The defining characteristic of letters of marque and reprisal
was profit and the financial independence resulting from it." One
Lobel refers briefly to wars and statements in the politically charged 1790s to support
his interpretation of the Clause. See Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1046 (cited in note 3)
(various statements from 1793 and later); id at 1061-63 (Neutrality Act of 1793, although
noting that neither the Act nor its legislative debates mentions the Marque and Reprisal
Clause); id at 1065-69 (Quasi-War with France from 1798 to 1800). See also Sofaer, War,
Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power at 105-11, 365-66 (cited in note 22) (discussing
controversy with France over outfitting French privateers in American harbors and ef-
forts to combat privateering in the Caribbean in the 1810s and 1820s); id at 140-42, 155,
163-64 (discussing various aspects of the Quasi-War).
' See Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 679-80 (cited in note 9). In the first North Carolina rati-
fying convention, which rejected the Constitution, the Marque and Reprisal Clause was
"read without any observation." Id at 683-84, quoting Jonathan Elliott, ed, 4 The Debates
in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 94 (Taylor &
Maury 1854). The ratification debates overall "were little concerned with how the new
government would initiate war." Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 683.
The Clause received only one brief mention at the Constitutional Convention, on
August 18, when Elbridge Gerry suggested adding to congressional powers "something [ I
concerning letters of marque, which he thought not included in the power of war." Adri-
enne Koch, ed, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Reported by James
Madison 478 (Norton 1978). Some have tried to read this as suggesting a desire to ensure
congressional power over all uses of American force. See, for example, Reveley, War Pow-
ers at 86 (cited in note 10). But see Grob, Relativity of War and Peace at 238-39 (cited in
note 5) ("It is not possible to say with what intention the founding fathers wrote [the
Clause] into the Constitution since there was no comment or debate as to [its] meaning in
the Constitutional Convention."). Grob looks instead to practice. Id at 239-47.
Publius only cursorily mentioned the Clause. Federalist 44 (Madison), in Clinton Res-
siter, ed, The Federalist Papers 280, 281 (Mentor 1961). Tangentially related references
can be found at Federalist 40 (Madison), id at 247, 250 (capture), Federalist 41 (Madison),
id at 255, 256 (absent from discussion of war powers), and Federalist 6 (Hamilton), id at
53, 59 (reprisals).
' A more precise definition of the relevant terms is necessary even though at the
time of the Revolutionary War, people used the relevant terms loosely. See Lobel, 134 U
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can divide this characteristic into three interrelated parts. First,
letters of marque and reprisal were more a commercial than a
military matter. Private shipowners had commercial goals and a
commercial mentality, and they were incompetent in normal war
activities. They contributed to the war effort through commercial
means-by disrupting British commerce and sustaining Ameri-
can commerce. Second, holders of letters of marque and reprisal
paid their own way. They received no government funds; instead
they often had to pay the government for supplies or were asked
to finance other governmental actions. Third, governmental con-
trol over the use of letters of marque and reprisal, to the extent it
existed at all, rested in the judiciary and focused on the legality
of and title to seized property-the booty or "prize" with which
privateers financed their voyages. This Part first examines the
law governing privateers during the Revolution, in light of these
three characteristics, and then explains each of them in more de-
tail.
A. The Law for Private Ships of War During the American
Revolution
The law that governed privateers and letters of marque
during the Revolution demonstrates the three characteristics
mentioned above: commercial motives, private funding, and af-
ter-the-fact judicial control. While Congress set most of the rules,
Massachusetts, which dominated privateering and all things na-
val during the war,29 acted first to authorize private armed ships
Pa L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 3) ("In eighteenth century America, the term 'letters of
marque and reprisal'... was used interchangably with the terms reprisal, privateer, and
commission . . . ."). Sometimes they merely spoke of "private ships of war," [Executive]
Council [of Pennsylvania] to Pres. Of Congress (Mar 3, 1778), in Samuel Hazard, ed, 6
Pennsylvania Archives 327 (Severns 1853), or "cruizing vessels," Pres. Of Congress to
Pres. Wharton [of Pennsylvania] (Mar 21, 1778), in Hazard, ed, 6 Pennsylvania Archives
at 378. A privateer was a private merchant ship authorized by some government and spe-
cially refitted for "the sole purpose of hunting down and capturing enemy ships and car-
goes." Sidney G. Morse, New England Privateering in the American Revolution 45-46
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard 1941) (available via WorldCat). A letter of
marque was a merchant ship with the primary purpose of trade, but with authority to
seize enemy ships that it encountered. The term "letter of marque," however, could refer
both to the authorizing letter (equivalent to the privateer's commission) or to the ship. In
the former meaning, it was not unusual for someone to say a privateer had received a let-
ter of marque. The line often blurred, and many vessels "embodied the characteristics of
both." Id at 45-46, 61-62. See also Gardner W. Allen, 1 A Naval History of the American
Revolution 45-46 (Houghton Mifflin 1913) (referring to "letters of marque" that Congress
issued "to privateers"). This Comment keeps the terms separate as much as possible, but,
like the historians, it emphasizes the privateers. See Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at
13-14 (cited in note 15).
See William M. Fowler, Jr., Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy During the
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and was one of only two states to do so before Congress acted.3 0
John Adams, a great advocate of privateering during the Revolu-
tionary War, extolled the Massachusetts privateering law as, ac-
cording to one scholar, "one of the most important documents of
the Revolution."3'
But the Massachusetts privateering law is remarkable for its
restraint. While Elbridge Gerry's preamble decried the
"despotism" of a British government "divested of justice and hu-
manity," and while he invoked Massachusetts's power under its
colonial charter to "kill, slay, destroy, and conquer,"32 the powers
for private armed ships were merely the following:
[T]he council of this colony... [may] commission, with let-
ters of marque and reprisal, any person or persons within
this colony, who shall, at his or their own expence, fix out
and equip, for the defence of America, any vessel, . . . and [ ]
all such persons so commissioned... shall have full power,
.. to sail on the seas, attack, take and bring into any port in
this colony, all vessels offending or employed by the enemy
... and also to retake and bring in... any vessel or vessels
that may be taken from any person or persons by said
enemy. 33
Revolution 54, 73-76 (Scribner's 1976). See also Charles Oscar Paullin, The Navy of the
American Revolution: Its Administration, its Policy, and its Achievements 148 (Chicago
1906) (New England was "the backbone" of revolutionary privateering. Massachusetts
sent out about one-third of the total number of privateers for the whole war, and Boston
was the chief center both for fitting out privateers and for selling prize.); Morse, New
England Privateering at 77-78 (cited in note 28). Pennsylvania was the other main source
of privateering and letters of marque. Morse, New England Privateering at 46; Fowler,
Rebels Under Sail at 74; Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 154-55.
' Morse, New England Privateering at 33-35 (Massachusetts), 52-53 (Rhode Island)
(cited in note 28).
" Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 321 (cited in note 29), referring to An
Act for Encouraging the Fixing Out of Armed Vessels to Defend the Sea-Coast of America,
and for Erecting a Court to Try and Condemn All Vessels That Shall Be Found Infesting
the Same, 1775 Mass Acts ch 7 ("Mass Armed Vessels Act"), reprinted in 5 The Acts and
Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 436 (Wright & Potter
1886) ("Mass Acts and Resolves"). Morse notes that only a sovereign government could
authorize privateers and letters of marque, so the act was effectively a declaration of in-
dependence, see Morse, New England Privateering at 47 (cited in note 28) (discussing
Congress's debate on granting commissions to privateers), and there was nothing covert
about it. See also Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 322-23 (cited in note 29)
(discussing the Massachusetts law generally).
' Mass Armed Vessels Act, 1775 Mass Acts ch 7, Preamble, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts
and Resolves at 436-37 (cited in note 31).
' Id, 1775 Mass Act ch 7, § 2, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts and Resolves at 437 (emphasis
added). Gerry's appeal to the charter was creative but dubious, since one doubts a gov-
ernment would issue a charter allowing a colony to make war against it. Morse, New Eng-
land Privateering at 34-35 (cited in note 28).
Marque and Reprisal
Thus, privateers paid their own way and aimed to seize British
ships, preferably returning them to Massachusetts in one piece.
Those receiving commissions had to post a bond, promising to ob-
serve the colony's laws and privateering instructions. 4 The law
also set up three courts of admiralty, empowering the judges to
call juries and to "have full cognizance of, and power to try the
justice of, the capture of any vessel or vessels that shall be taken
...."" The persons making a capture had to make out a bill de-
scribing the ship captured and including "a schedule of the cargo
on board her" when captured. If the jury's verdict justified
"condemn[ing]" the ship and its cargo, the judge would order eve-
rything sold and give the proceeds, minus court costs, "to the
captors, their agents or attorneys."36
In March 1776, the Continental Congress responded to the
wails of suffering merchants by enacting national rules for let-
ters of marque and reprisal.17 These rules follow the same pat-
tern as Massachusetts's-emphasizing lawful seizure of British
ships and cargo with minimal destruction. Denouncing the Brit-
ish for "wasting, spoiling, and destroying the country, burning
houses and defenceless towns, and exposing the helpless inhabi-
tants to every misery," and lamenting Britain's embargo on
American trade and authorization of seizure of American goods
at sea, Congress authorized all inhabitants of the colonies "to fit
out armed vessels to cruize on the enemies" of the colonies.38 But
Congress limited lawful prize to ships (and their cargoes) be-
longing to British inhabitants (except "friends of the American
cause") if taken by a commissioned ship and "libelled and prose-
cuted" in any maritime court.39 All prizes, after deductions for
court costs, went to those capturing the ship."
A few weeks later, Congress created a mechanism for carry-
ing out this new law and drafted instructions for privateers and
' Mass Armed Vessels Act, 1775 Mass Acts ch 7, § 3, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts and
Resolves at 437-38 (cited in note 31).
Id, 1775 Mass Acts ch 7, §§ 4-7, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts and Resolves at 438-39.
Id, 1775 Mass Acts ch 7, § 8, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts and Resolves at 439-40. For
an overview of the history and development of the Massachusetts privateering law, see
Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 321-28 (cited in note 29).
Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789
229-33 (Mar 23, 1776) (GPO 1906) (text of the resolution). Philadelphia merchants had
petitioned Congress on the matter just before Congress acted. Morse, New England Pri-
vateering at 41 (cited in note 28). Other states had petitioned previously, Rhode Island
most vociferously among them. Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 47-49 (cited in note 29).
Ford, ed, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress at 229-30 (cited in note 37).
Id at 230-31.
Id at 231-32. Owners, captains, and crew contracted for the proportions, which the
prize court would allocate.
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holders of letters of marque and reprisal that emphasized the
project's commercial nature and judicial "supervision." Congress
sent blank commissions to the states; the states then filled them
out and gave them to the chosen applicants. 41 Any party receiving
a commission had to post a bond promising neither to depart
from his commission "to make Captures of British Vessels and
Cargoes" nor to transgress Congress's instructions.42 The instruc-
tions authorized commissioned ships to "by force of arms, attack,
subdue, and take" all British ships.
But the force was to be directed at the capture of British
ships, not their total destruction. Privateers were to bring ships
and their cargoes to American ports for court proceedings and
were to "keep and preserve every ship or vessel, and cargo ...
until they shall ... be adjudged lawful prizes; not selling, spoil-
ing, wasting, or diminishing the same, or breaking the bulk
thereof, nor suffering any such thing to be done."43 Congress
warned against any killing "in cold blood," maiming, or torturing,
promised severe punishment, and warned that any act contrary
to instructions might not only lead to forfeiting the bond but also
to liability for damages.'
Congress modified the law throughout the war, but the
modifications continued to reflect the commercial nature of let-
ters of marque and reprisal.45 A 1780 revision granted privateers
41 For examples, see 11 Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania 2-
3, 21 (Nov 13, 1776) (Fenn 1852) (granting commissions for "Letters of Mark," naming the
captains and owners, and stating the size and armament of each ship). See also The Peti-
tion of Stephen Joseph Rouget (Aug 30, 1777), in Samuel Hazard, ed, 5 Pennsylvania Ar-
chives 569 (Severns 1853) (petition to the governor for a commission). For a flurry of let-
ters between the Pennsylvania executive council, hungry for blank commissions, and the
President of Congress, sending them as fast as he could, see Hazard, ed, 6 Pennsylvania
Archives at 327-28, 378, 670, 726, 727 (cited in note 28), and Samuel Hazard, ed, 7 Penn-
sylvania Archives 224, 536 (Severns 1853).
Ford, ed, 4 Continental Congress at 252-53 (Apr 3, 1776) (cited in note 37).
Id at 253-54.
Id at 254.
"Unlike many other laws of the notoriously feeble Continental Congress, most states
followed these. Massachusetts and Rhode Island quickly revised their laws to conform to
Congress's. Morse, New England Privateering at 52 (cited in note 28). Other states passed
laws setting up prize courts and authorizing the executive to issue the commissions that
Congress supplied. Although the states controlled the prize courts, Congress set up an
appeals committee that evolved into a regular court. See, for example, Charles Hoadly,
ed, 15 The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut 280-81, 318-19 (Case, Lockwood
1890) (resolutions of May 1776, carrying out Congress's resolutions). The only real breach
of Congress's rules was the states' inconsistency in sending the required congressional
bonds, see Morse, New England Privateering at 53-54 (cited in note 28), and, later in the
war, efforts to restrict appeals, id at 55-56. While states could require bonds in addition to
congressional ones, and often did, they rarely issued their own commissions, even though
the Articles of Confederation, which took effect in 1781, authorized them to do so "after a
declaration of war by the United States." Articles of Confederation, Art 6, § 5, reprinted
[64:953
Marque and Reprisal
the new power to seize property "by land as well as by water" and
admonished them not to seize neutral property or ships.46 Laws,
enacted in 1781, aimed to be harsher on the British, to end any
"indulgences and exemptions." Nevertheless, they merely
granted private ships "general reprisals" to seize "ships, vessels,
and goods, belonging to the King or Crown of Great Britain, or to
his subjects," and required "all manner of captures, seizures,
prizes and reprisals of all ships and goods" to pass through a
prize court.47
B. The Commercial Nature of Privateering in the
Revolutionary War
Privateering was far more of a business than a military ex-
ploit.4" This Section demonstrates this claim first by direct his-
torical evidence, then by considering criticisms of revolutionary
privateers, the privateers' aversion to and incompetence in true
military action, and the largely commercial nature of even their
excesses.
1. Privateering as business.
Above all, privateering was a business.49 While its military
value-still much debated-was in "commerce-destroying" 50 and
in "harassing the Commerce of the Enemy,"5 this was only one
in 1 Stat 4, 5 (1778).
' Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 16 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-
1789 404-08 (May 2, 1780) (GPO 1910). Additional instructions later that year confirmed
Congress's concern for not seizing neutral ships. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 18
Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 1097-98 (Nov 27, 1780) (GPO 1910).
" Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 19 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-
1789 314-16 (Mar 27, 1781), 360-64 (Apr 7, 1781) (GPO 1912). The exemption at issue was
Bermuda, which had been friendly to America. The 1781 law largely ended the exemp-
tion, including only an exemption for a particular load of salt. Id at 316.
' Scholars have often overlooked this. See Morse, New England Privateering at 538
(cited in note 28) ("Insufficient emphasis has usually been laid upon the economic, as
opposed to the military, aspects of privateering.... Probably most people at the time
usually thought of it in that light, as is suggested by the frequent references to the
'privateering business.-).
See Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 149-51 (cited in note 29).
The term "commerce-destroying" is ubiquitous in descriptions of privateering and
letters of marque. One historian has proclaimed that "Ithe essential feature of priva-
teering is commerce destroying." Maclay, History of Privateers at xxiii (cited in note 7).
See also, for example, Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 13 (cited in note 29) ("destroying en-
emy commerce"); Gardner W. Allen, 2 A Naval History of the American Revolution 662
(Houghton Mifflin 1913) ("commerce destroying"); Paullin, Navy of the American Revolu-
tion at 147 (cited in note 29) ("commerce-destroying").
"1 Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 47 (cited in note 15), quoting a petition to Mas-
sachusetts authorities for a commission. This effect cut the other way, as British priva-
teers upset American trade. Thomas Jefferson, as governor of Virginia, frequently com-
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side of the coin. Privateering was also commerce-producing,
which was the only reason private parties would run the risks of
fitting out their ships. What the privateers "destroyed," or rather
seized, became the property of the crew and owners of the priva-
teering vessel, who could sell their capture at great profit. This
ersatz commerce was the "life blood of New England" during the
Revolution, as the region quickly learned every time it embar-
goed privateers and letters of marque.2 John Adams lamented
one such embargo by stating his opposition to "all shackles upon
Trade."" Besides supplying essentials to both private citizens
and the army (for the right price), privateers introduced a
booming supply of previously rare goods from the West Indies.54
They also sustained an economy crippled by British blockades:
over two thousand private American armed vessels roamed the
seas during the Revolution, employing seventy thousand men,
which does not include the employment that the privateers and
letters of marque sustained ashore.5 Privateering thus was the
business of "harassing the[ ] enemy and profiting by the opera-
tion."56
plained about this. See, for example, Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (June 19, 1779), in
Julian P. Boyd, ed, 3 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4, 5 (Princeton 1951). See also Jef-
ferson to the Committee of Congress at Headquarters (July 2, 1780), in Boyd, ed, 3 Papers
of Thomas Jefferson at 476, and Jefferson to Samuel Huntington (July 2, 1780), in Boyd,
ed, 3 Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 477. For a brief account of one raid in Chesapeake
Bay, see James L. Howard, Seth Harding, Mariner: A Naval Picture of the Revolution 91-
92 (Yale 1930).
Morse, New England Privateering at 397 ("life blood"), 200 (embargo) (cited in note
28). The embargoes aimed to shore up sagging naval and army recruitment.
' John Adams to James Warren (Apr 6, 1777), in Robert J. Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of
John Adams 144, 145 (Belknap 1983).
' Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 17 (cited in note 15), quoting James Warren to
Samuel Adams (Aug 15, 1776). Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 150 (cited in
note 29) ("Due credit must always be given to the hardy and venturesome privateersmen
for supplying the army and navy with the sinews of war," although "it was to be had by
paying a good round price for it in the open market."). John Adams was a zealot for priva-
teering during the War. He claimed that New England, the center of privateering, was
supplying the rest of the colonies at reduced prices and that the Continental Army would
have been powerless without supplies from the privateers. John Adams to William Tudor
(Mar 22, 1777), in Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams at 120-21 (cited in note 53).
"Allen, 1 Naval History at 47 (cited in note 28); Morse, New England Privateering at
397-98 (cited in note 28) ("[Plrivateering had to a large degree taken the place of that
commerce which was the life blood of New England. The privateers brought in the
goods-acquired by capture instead of by purchase or exchange-and gave the employ-
ment provided in peace time by ordinary commerce.... [A]lmost all New England was
concerned in [privateering], one way or another."); id at 538 ("The privateering of the
Revolution, including the work of the letters of marque, provided a substitute for peace-
time trade .... Privateering gave employment, uncertain and dangerous though it was, to
New England's maritime resources.., and such employment was indispensible ...
"Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 13 (cited in note 15).
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It is therefore no surprise that privateering and legitimate
trade existed in inverse proportion during the American Revolu-
tion and were usually conducted by the same persons.57 As the
British increased their harassment of American trade, merchants
saw privateering as the natural alternative. Privateering was a
"kindred occupation" by which these "[m]erchant-privateer own-
ers" might recover the losses to their trading businesses." Even
governments referred to these vessels' actions as "mercantile
voyages."59 So privateering was both an alternative to trade and a
form of trade itself."
While the risks of privateering exceeded those of normal
trading, the potential gains were also that much greater. Entire
fortunes could be created: "Stories of men made wealthy for the
rest of their lives by a single voyage filled seaport taverns from
Boston to Lorient."6 ' The peak year for privateering was 1776,
and it is no surprise that this year was popularly named not with
reference to the military, but rather with reference to the year's
monstrous profitability: "The Harvest."2 Many other privateers,
seeking to match this success, found only sorrow in their search
for riches.' With good reason, historians have compared the
' Morse, New England Privateering at 395 (cited in note 28) (Entrance into the war
by France in 1778 and Spain in 1779 on America's side led to rising American trade and a
corresponding drop in privateering.); id at 533 (discussing refitting of the privateer Grand
Turk for "merchant service" in 1783).
Howard, Seth Harding at 68 (cited in note 51) ("kindred occupation"); Morse, New
England Privateering at 187, 191 (cited in note 28) ("merchant-privateer owners"). See
also Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 149 (cited in note 29) (a "recompense"
for lost commerce); John Dewar Faibisy, Privateering and Piracy: The Effects of New Eng-
land Raiding Upon Nova Scotia During the American Revolution, 1775-1783 ii
(unpublished PhD dissertation, U Mass 1972) (available via WorldCat) (Frustrated trad-
ers "turned to privateering and piracy" in order to "recoup their losses.").
" Resolutions of Congress (Nov 10, 1780), in Samuel Hazard, ed, 8 Pennsylvania Ar-
chives 603, 603-04 (Severns 1853); Proceedings of the General Assembly (Jan 17, 1781), in
John Russell Bartlett, ed, 9 Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Planta-
tions in New England 314, 322 (Alfred Anthony 1864).
"Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 13 (cited in note 15) ("the trade of privateering").
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 282 (cited in note 29). See also Paullin, Navy of the
American Revolution at 149-50 (cited in note 29) (recounting tale of someone drawing "a
competence sufficient for almost a lifetime" from a privateering mission); Allen, Massa-
chusetts Privateers at 53 (cited in note 15) ("The foundations of many fortunes ... were
laid by these enterprising mariners."). Famous beneficiaries of this practice include Na-
thaniel Shaw, see Morse, New England Privateering ch 13 (cited in note 28), and Louis F.
Middlebrook, 2 History of Maritime Connecticut During the American Revolution: 1775-
1783 50-53, 207-09 (Essex Inst 1925); Robert Morris, see Arthur D. Pierce, Smugglers'
Woods: Jaunts and Journeys in Colonial and Revolutionary New Jersey 56-57 (Rutgers
1960); and the Cabot family of Beverly, Massachusetts, see Morse, New England Priva-
teering ch 18 (cited in note 28).
"Morse, New England Privateering at 117 ("The Harvest"), 134-37 (the profits), 492
(comparing 1782 to earlier years) (cited in note 28).
"Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 55 (cited in note 15); Paullin, Navy of the Ameri-
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"new trade" of privateering to stock market speculation and to a
lottery.'
2. Opposition to privateering.
Tales of wild profiteering by privateers were bound to dis-
may the more military-minded in the country, and their concerns
further illustrate the commercial as opposed to military nature of
privateering. The two main complaints both derived from its
profitability: privateering's lures deprived the official armed
forces of potential recruits, and privateering corrupted public
morals.
While many early in the War argued that privateering would
be a nursery of seamen for the navy, it quickly revealed itself as
"the mortal enemy of the regular naval establishment" and a
magnet for deserters from both the navy and army.65 Faced with
a choice between the Continental Navy, in which the government
received a sizable percentage of the prize, and privateering, in
which the crew and owner divided it all and sailors received a
higher base pay, the choice of "Mammon" and the seductive
promise of glorious riches over patriotism and public service was
easy.66 Even if the Continental Congress had not taken a cut of
can Revolution at 150 (cited in note 29).
Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 16 (cited in note 15) (speculation); Paullin, Navy
ofthe American Revolution at 149 (cited in note 29) ('he new trade [of privateering] was
as alluring as a lottery.").
Morse, New England Privateering at 172 (cited in note 28). For an example of early
enthusiasm for privateering as a means of building a navy, see The Committee of Secret
Correspondence [Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris] to Silas Deane (Oct 1, 1776), in
William B. Willcox, ed, 22 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 639, 644 (Yale 1982) ('The
success in privateering and encouragement given by the Merchants will inevitably bring
Seamen amongst us... [and] encourage the breeding of seamen....").
Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 149 (cited in note 29) (discussing
"Yankee privateersmen, whose love for Mammon exceeded that for their country"). Many
who criticize privateering grudgingly acknowledge that even if commerce-raiding could
never win a war, the profit motive induced many to seek out-and to sell in the colonies-
critical supplies for America's military, commerce, and other activities which depended on
that commerce. See, for example, Morse, New England Privateering at 537-38, 397-98
(cited in note 28) (summarizing views of historians and emphasizing importance of priva-
teering for providing supplies, commerce, and employment). These supplies were crucial
in the latter half of the war, according to one historian, Maclay, History of Privateers at
206 (cited in note 7), and in the beginning, according to another, Allen, 2 Naval History at
663 (cited in note 50). Privateering also served a commerce-destroying function-
unsettling the British fleet and impressing the French, see Morse, New England Priva-
teering at 253-63 (British fears), 264-75 (French) (cited in note 28)-though the British
disrupted American commerce as well. See, for example, The Commissioners [B. Frank-
lin, A. Lee, and J. Adams] to Vergennes (Apr 19, 1778), in Robert J. Taylor, ed, 6 Papers
of John Adams 42 (Belknap 1983) ("[M]any Adventurers to America are discouraged by
the high Price of Insurance, and the Number of Captures made by the English, which to-
gether have an Operation almost equal to an Embargo.").
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the prize-two-thirds for much of the war-naval recruiters faced
the additional difficulty that the Continental Navy could not de-
vote all of its time to profit and plunder as could the privateers.
Other less lucrative tasks interfered, such as hunting down
British men-of-war, running dispatches, and guarding convoys
and harbors." To the extent that the navy did raid foreign com-
merce, it did so partly to compete with privateers for recruits.69
States frequently grew frustrated with this lost manpower and
embargoed privateers and letters of marque, or required them to
prove that their crews contained no deserters." Pennsylvania
tried offering rewards for information on anyone who deserted
the army for privateering.71 Most of these efforts failed misera-
bly.7
2
The second complaint against the private armed mer-
chants-that they undermined public morals-also derived from
the allure of profit rather than the ravages of war. Popular sen-
timent oscillated with the popular condition. Before the war,
there was general opposition to privateering on moral and hu-
manitarian grounds. The flush of battle and profit in 1776
quickly converted the opposition, as the country became
"privateering mad."73 Less than a year later, the masses had re-
verted, deciding that privateering endangered the war effort,
' Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 281-84 (cited in note 29). See also Allen, Massachu-
setts Privateers at 14 (cited in note 15).
Howard, Seth Harding at 69 (cited in note 51).
Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 348 (cited in note 29). Other reasons
included military weakness and "the commercial spirit of the times." Id. See also Fowler,
Rebels Under Sail at 69 (cited in note 29) ("[Mlany people looked upon the navy as noth-
ing more than a glorified privateering fleet.").
" See, for example, Proceedings of the General Assembly (July 1780), in Bartlett, ed,
9 Records of Rhode Island at 120, 144 (cited in note 59) (ending an embargo, except for
privateers, so long as ships' masters or owners showed that their sailors' towns had met
"the full quotas of men" and made an oath that none of their crew came from a town that
had not met its quota; subjecting letters of marque to the same restriction but also for-
bidding them from carrying more than twelve men); Act of General Assembly (May 1780),
in Charles J. Hoadly, ed, 3 The Public Records of the State of Connecticut 1, 13 (Case,
Lockwood 1922) (embargoing "all privateers, letters of marque and armed vessels" until
August,. . . "except such as are in continental service .... ."); Allen, Massachusetts Priva-
teers at 14-15 (cited in note 15) (noting the repeated embargoes to fill army quotas and
man the Continental Navy); Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams at 145 n 3 (cited in note
53) (summarizing Massachusetts embargoes in 1776 and 1777).
71 Colonel L. Nicola to President Reed (May 23, 1780), in Hazard, ed, 8 Pennsylvania
Archives at 262 (cited in note 59).
,' John Adams, as usual, mocked the embargoes. Referring to a Massachusetts em-
bargo, he wrote, "I doubt much whether you have got an hundred soldiers the more for
your Embargo and perhaps you have missed Opportunities of taking many Prizes and
several Hundreds of seamen." John Adams to James Warren (Apr 6, 1777), in Taylor, ed,
5 Papers of John Adams at 144, 145 (cited in note 53).
Morse, New England Privateering at 117-18 (cited in note 28).
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since the thirst for profit allegedly divided loyalties. Privateer-
merchants bore the blame for any scarcity of goods and for high
prices because it was thought that their greed had corrupted
their patriotism. Privateering was "an all-pervasive evil, infect-
ing the entire social fabric and undermining the morals and pa-
triotism of New England." 4 But embargoes made goods even
more scarce and more expensive, and suddenly popular support
for privateering rose again."
3. Reluctant and incompetent warriors.
Privateersmen were traders, not fighters. Their aversion to
battle, especially the owners', was easy to foresee. Clashing un-
necessarily with a British warship was both folly and bad busi-
ness, since such ships rarely carried the goods privateers
sought.76 Flight was far preferable to fight." Fights with British
privateers were more common and made more business sense,
but the goal was still to capture (or recapture) the prize and to
fight only as a last resort.7' A privateer might also spar with its
' Id at 184. See, for example, William Tudor to John Adams (Sept 23, 1776), in Tay-
lor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams 36, 37 (cited in note 53) ("New England has Men of Sense
and Honour who might soon become good Officers, but the Gentlemen there are so totally
absorb'd by the Auri sacra fames [the Accursed thirst for gold], and the Views of making
Fortunes by Privateering, that no other consideration seems to be attended to.")
(translation at Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams at 38 n 4); William Tudor to John Ad-
ams (Oct 3, 1776), in Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams at 43, 44-45 ("1 most heartily
wish... that young Gentlemen in Boston and everywhere else would prefer engaging in
the best of all Causes, that of defending their Country, to raising dishonorable Fortunes
by privateering."). A frequently quoted complaint is that of William Whipple to Josiah
Bartlett (July 12, 1778), in Allen, 1 Naval History at 48 (cited in note 28):
No kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and every
kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people. Those who
are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right & wrong, & for want of an op-
portunity of gratifying their insatiable avarice with the property of the Enemies of
their Country, will without the least compunction seize that of her Friends.
7 Morse, New England Privateering at 200 (cited in note 28).
" Maclay, History of Privateers at 23 (cited in note 7). See also J. Roger Fredland, et
al, American Sea Power Since 1775 70 (Lippincott 1947) (telling of an American privateer
captain in the War of 1812 who boarded and captured a British naval schooner, then
apologized to his employers for "having sought a contest with a king's ship, knowing that
is not our object").
' Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 13 (cited in note 29) ("[The privateers'] task was to
take merchantmen while eluding the enemy's warships.").
7 See, for example, Maclay, History of Privateers at 138, 142-45 (cited in note 7)
(recounting the celebrated duel of the American privateer General Pickering (owned by
Nathaniel Shaw) and the British letter of marque Achilles off the coast of Bilboa, Spain,
on June 4, 1780. The battle occurred only because the Achilles captured a prize the Gen-
eral Pickering had taken. The Achilles fled after a three-hour battle, and the General
Pickering recaptured its prize.). For another account, see Morse, New England Privateer-
ing at 441-51 (cited in note 28), which makes clear that the Achilles's meddling with the
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prey, the goal being even more clearly to profit, but one hoped the
fighting did not cause the prey to sink, at least not until it had
been separated from its cargo."9 For privateers and letters of
marque, fighting was accidental." Owners wanted their ships in
one piece, and crews dreamed of easy pickings-seeking their
glory in wealth, not heroics."' The thoughts of a typical com-
mander of a privateer or letter of marque were easy to read: pre-
serve the ship and avoid risks.82 Such a mentality was hardly
that of a warrior, but it conformed to the accepted commercial
nature and role of privateering in the Revolution. As John Adams
wrote in praise of privateering, "[flIt is by cutting off supplies, not
by attacks, sieges, or assaults, that I expect deliverance from
enemies."'
Given such a nonmilitary mentality, nearly every privateer
effort at coordinated combat, whether with other privateers or
American naval ships, predictably failed." Privateers tended to
roam individually and so lacked organizational skills or any in-
clination to follow orders from other ships.85 Hoping that the
crews would overcome this deficiency was an exercise in self-
delusion, since many joined privateers precisely for the lax disci-
General Pickering's prize sparked the battle.
, See Middlebrook, 2 Maritime Connecticut at 207-08 (cited in note 61) (noting the
battle of the American privateer Revenge and the British ships the Thames and the
Sarah, which the Revenge won, with the result that the Revenge's commander manned
the Thames and sent it to Boston to be sold for prize); Maclay, History of Privateers at 23
(cited in note 7) (an overwrought observation of how much sinking one's prize while at-
tempting to capture it was frowned upon).
" See Pierce, Smugglers' Woods at 62 (cited in note 61) ("[Many a privateer could
haul in prize after prize without fight or bloodshed....").
" See Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 282 (cited in note 29) (Recruits were "entranced
by glorious stories of richly laden Indiamen sailing unescorted and ready to strike their
flag at the mere sight of an open gun port."); James Sullivan to John Adams and Elbridge
Gerry (Oct 11, 1776), in Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams 50, 52 (cited in note 53)
("[Aien go on Board privateers where they are in Little danger from fighting and get
more of the prizes they take.").
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 116 (cited in note 29).
Allen, 1 Naval History at 50 (cited in note 28), quoting a September 16, 1780, letter
from John Adams to the President of Congress.
Allen, 2 Naval History at 663 (cited in note 50); Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at
50 (cited in note 15) ("Privateers were ill adapted for cruising in squadrons and failed in
nearly all attempts at cooperation with regular ships or with each other.... [Wihen any-
thing like manceuvring was required, they were incapable of concerted action."); Maclay,
History of Privateers at xxiv (cited in note 7) ("There are a few instances where our early
privateers rendered assistance to the regular navy; but then there are more instances
where they were a positive hindrance.").
Maclay, History of Privateers at xxiv (cited in note 7) (lack of organizational skills);
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 95, 113-14 (cited in note 29) (lack of organization and re-
fusal to follow orders).
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pline on board.86 The various committees and boards that strug-
gled to administer the navy quickly learned that joint operations
with privateers were worth avoiding."
An example of the privateers' ineptitude for battle is the Pe-
nobscot Expedition in 1779 against a British base on the Penob-
scot River in Maine. It was the largest fleet assembled during the
war-and the largest American amphibious operation until the
Mexican War over sixty years later.8" Massachusetts organized
and funded a fleet that totaled about forty ships, of which at
least twenty were armed. Twelve to sixteen of the ships were pri-
vateers (impressed and insured against loss by Massachusetts).89
Nearly every ship was lost, at extraordinary cost to Massachu-
setts, and while American bungling was ubiquitous, privateers
clearly contributed to the failure. General Solomon Lovell, com-
manding land operations, repeatedly sought to attack, fearing
the arrival of British reinforcements. Commodore Dudley Salton-
stall, commanding the fleet, stalled, and Lovell could not attack
without naval support. Historians pin much of the blame for the
Commodore's timidity on the privateers, who, more concerned
with protecting their ships than with military tactics, urged him
to stall. When the British reinforcements did arrive-just as Sal-
tonstall got around to acting-the privateers "fled like stampeded
cattle."" Such behavior cemented the Continental government's
aversion to joint actions with privateers.9
' See John W. Jackson, The Pennsylvania Navy 1775-1781: The Defense of the Dela-
ware 13 (Rutgers 1974) ("[R]egular naval service, with its discipline and restraints, did
not offer the allure that the almost total freedom of a privateersman could guarantee.");
Allen, 1 Naval History at 50 (cited in note 28) (same).
Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 153 (cited in note 29); Allen, 2 Naval
History at 498 (cited in note 50); Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 114, 119 (cited in note 29).
Thus Lobel is at best imprecise and at worst completely wrong when he claims privateers
fought "in place of or alongside public naval vessels." Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1044 (cited
in note 3). Those interested in the shifting "organization" of naval governance during the
Revolution should look to the chart in Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 62.
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 114 (cited in note 29).
On the numbers, compare the accounts of Allen, 2 Naval History at 420-21 (cited in
note 50); Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 113-14 (cited in note 29); and Paullin, Navy of the
American Revolution at 349-50 (cited in note 29).
Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 52 (cited in note 15).
"It also led to a court-martial and discharge for Saltonstall. For full accounts of the
Expedition, see Morse, New England Privateering at 343-81 (cited in note 28); Allen, 2
Naval History at 419-38 (cited in note 50); Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 111-18 (cited in
note 29); and Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 347-53 (cited in note 29). On
the Continental government's policy, see Fowler, Rebels Under Sail at 114, 119 ("The
Maritime Committee always looked askance at such joint ventures, and the events at Pe-
nobscot fully justified their misgivings.... But for practical reasons of manning and sup-
ply they were often forced to relent in this policy and allow exceptions.").
A few other examples further illustrate the privateers' skittishness in true warfare.
Two years before the Penobscot Expedition, nine privateers sailed from Boston with two
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4. Privateer misbehavior: the rule and some exceptions.
Notwithstanding the bad reputation that privateers acquired
for breaching their instructions and for unauthorized pillaging,
they generally behaved themselves. 92 This is exactly what one
would expect of people who were more traders and businessmen
than warriors. The excesses prove the rule: privateering in Long
Island Sound shows that actions beyond merely seizing ships and
their cargoes were rare and generally discouraged by authorities
and that "pillaging," even when unauthorized, usually was con-
fined to seizing property.9"
Privateering in Long Island Sound in the latter half of the
war was fierce, but it was the exception in the Revolution. The
fighting erupted between Connecticut and loyalist Long Island
and Connecticut history is filled with governmental efforts to
hold the privateers within their proper bounds. 4 While Connecti-
cut did issue special commissions for cruising in Long Island
Sound,95 it soon had second thoughts. In January 1781, it issued
Continental frigates for a month-long cruise. Within a few days of leaving port, all but
one of the privateers had scattered, and if they made any efforts to rejoin the "fleet," they
were unsuccessfiul. See Morse, New England Privateering at 215-17 (cited in note 28). In
1781, almost all of the Cabots' privateers appeared off the Irish coast, most likely part of
a plan by the Cabots to have their ships cruise the British Isles as a fleet. They came no
closer to creating such a fleet than a wispy four-ship squadron that evaporated at the first
sight of a British man-of-war, offering "merely [ I another example of the inability of pri-
vateers, no matter how strong or numerous, to cope with regular naval vessels." Id at 48.
In 1782, five American privateers joined forces to raid the British island of Tortola in the
West Indies, but navigational errors and poor planning undermined the effort. Their
threat to bombard the port town crumbled as soon as one of the privateers found itself
threatened. See id at 502-06. Maclay gives a more favorable account, but it is clouded by
his enthusiasm; he also admits to lacking information. Maclay, History of Privateers at
214-15 (cited in note 7).
" Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 15 (cited in note 15) ("American privateersmen
in general conducted themselves in an orderly manner.... [I]f excesses were committed
they must have been rare. The commonly expressed opinion that privateering was little
better than piracy did not apply to these men."). British "pillaging" in Chesapeake Bay
and along the Virginia coast, much bemoaned by Thomas Jefferson, see note 51, appears
to have confined itself to the usual seizure of ships, often from their ports. See Howard,
Seth Harding at 91-92 (cited in note 51); Thomas Jefferson to the Committee of Congress
at Headquarters (July 2, 1780), in Boyd, ed, 3 Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 476 (cited in
note 51); Jefferson to Samuel Huntington (July 2, 1780), in Boyd, ed, 3 Papers of Thomas
Jefferson at 477 (both letters lamenting the swarm of British privateers, but only because
they were cruising in the Bay waiting to pick off any shipping).
' For a discussion of the additional problem of seizing neutral or friendly property,
see text accompanying notes 127-32. See also Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 16 (cited
in note 15) ("This reprehensible practice was afterwards corrected by stringent regula-
tions.").
Morse, New England Privateering at 83-84, 222, 385-86 (cited in note 28). It flared
in 1779, when the British left Newport, Rhode Island. Id at 383.
'5 Id at 556. See, for example, Hoadly, ed, 3 Records of Connecticut at 103, 103 (May
29, 1780) (cited in note 70) (governor and council of safety issuing a commission "to cruize
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a blanket repeal of all commissions, on account "of the many evils
committed by the armed boats in this State."96 That fall, state
authorities acted more precisely, by revoking the special permis-
sion to seize property from land on Long Island. 7 This permis-
sion had been an exception to the usual rules of privateering,"
and both of these resolutions demonstrate by their wording that
the proper role of privateers was to seize enemy property and to
do so at sea.99
C. No Governmental Funding of Privateers and Letters of
Marque
The commercial nature of privateering made possible a
closely related but key aspect little noted in the current litera-
ture: the privateers relied entirely on private funding. While they
depended on the government for their authorization and legal ti-
tle to their prize and nominally had governmental instructions to
obey, they enjoyed no access to the government's purse.' 0 Thus
the standard commission authorized privateers "to fit out" a
ship.' Their prizes supported them.
in the Sound"), and id at 118, 119 (June 30, 1780) (same).
Hoadly, ed, 3 Records of Connecticut at 292, 292-93 (Jan 23, 1781) (cited in note 70).
Id at 512, 513 (Sept 15, 1781).
Morse, New England Privateering at 386 (cited in note 28).
Hoadly, ed, 3 Records of Connecticut at 292, 292 (Jan 23, 1781) (cited in note 70)
(denouncing privateers who received commissions "for the pretended purpose of making
captures on the enemy and preventing and intercepting illicit trade and traders" but then
used them to commit "evils"); id at 512, 513 (Sept 15, 1781) (noting that commissions for
cruising the Sound had empowered armed boats "not only to cruise on the high seas
against the enemy but to land on Long Island and there take all British property").
The lessons of privateering against Nova Scotia are similar. While every major
coastal town other than Halifax (the British base in North America) endured some
American raiding, many of the raiding ships lacked commissions. They were thus pirates
and criminals rather than privateers; true privateers focused on their usual business of
seizing ships. Even the worst pillaging tended to be confined to property seizure. Massa-
chusetts denounced robberies along the Nova Scotia shore and ordered special bonds to
prevent them. In 1780, Congress did authorize seizure on land, see text accompanying
note 46, but on the whole "piracy predominated over privateering" in Nova Scotia-the
land seizures were not the work of commissioned privateers. Faibisy, Privateering and
Piracy at 102 (cited in note 58). The "grievances" that Nova Scotians endured tended to be
"economic" and most of these involved seizures of their ships in harbor. Id at 100. For an
account of one famous raid that pushed the limits of the idea of privateering as prize-
taking, see Allen, 2 Naval History at 595-96 (cited in note 50) (recounting the raid on
Lunenberg).
"°The exception was when the government impressed privateers for naval missions,
in which case it usually insured the owners against loss. Examples include the Penobscot
Expedition and the voyage of the Hancock and Boston, see notes 88-91 and accompanying
text.
... Ford, ed, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress at 229, 230 (cited in note 37). Mas-
sachusetts's law was more explicit on this. See Mass Armed Vessels Act, 1775 Mass Acts
ch 7 § 2, reprinted in 5 Mass Acts and Resolves at 437 (cited in note 31) ("[The council...
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Privateering was an investment opportunity. While Na-
thaniel Shaw and those with similar wealth often could finance
their own ships, consortiums for this purpose were numerous,
both for raising capital and for spreading risk."2 Records are re-
plete with accounts of "part owners" of ships and with the peti-
tions of joint investors or owners of shares. °3 A single individual
could have shares in numerous ships,' 4 and ownership of a single
ship was often subdivided minutely,' 5 even into "parts of
shares."'06
Privateer owners paid for everything. Besides the ship it-
self, '7 this included gunpowder and cannons, often bought from
the state (since they were rationed), and the payroll, composed of
both wages and a division of any prize.' 8 Payment by private
shall be [ ] impowered to commission, with letters of marque and reprisal, any person or
persons within this colony, who shall, at his or their own expence, fix out and equip...
any vessel.") (emphasis added). Nathaniel Shaw once requested a commission by ex-
plaining that he had "put on board" his ships "eight carriage guns and men sufficient to
fight them." Middlebrook, 2 Maritime Connecticut at 50 (cited in note 61).
..
2 John A. McManemin, Sea Raiders from Connecticut During the American Revolu-
tion, Part One (Connecticut) (Introduction) (Ho-Ho-Kus 1995). Id, Part Two
(Pennsylvania) at 292-93.
"See, for example, Bartlett, ed, 8 Records of Rhode Island at 234 (May 19, 1777)
(cited in note 59) (noting that Samuel Sheffield sought and received a commission for
himself and "such others as may join him" in fitting out a privateer); Hoadly, ed, 15
Records of Connecticut at 462 (July 3, 1776) (cited in note 45) (granting a letter of marque
to "Capt. Thorp . . .part owner of the privateer Broome"); id at 525 (Sept 26, 1776)
(mentioning ownership of a privateer by "Messrs. Lyon & Co."); Allen, Massachusetts Pri-
vateers at 46-47 (cited in note 15) (quoting the petition of Joseph Cutler and noting that
he sought and received a commission for "himself and others concerned in the armed pri-
vateer Brigantine called the Gates").
"See John Bondfield to Commissioners (Aug 26, 1778), in Taylor, ed, 6 Papers of
John Adams at 397, 398 n 1 (cited in note 66) (noting a privateer captain "who either
commanded or held some interest in at least ten different vessels during the... Revolu-
tion"). See also note 61 (Nathaniel Shaw).
"C Robert Morris claimed a 1124 share in the infamous privateer Phoenix. Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed, 14 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 838 (July 16,
1779) (GPO 1909).
C Colonel L. Nicola to President Reed (May 23, 1780), in Hazard, ed, 8 Pennsylvania
Archives at 262, 262 (cited in note 59).7 See, for example, Jackson, Pennsylvania Navy at 286 (cited in note 86).
"See, for example, Hoadly, ed, 15 Records of Connecticut at 401, 460 (cited in note
45) (state selling gunpowder to a privateer); id at 525 (state selling cannons to a priva-
teer); id at 459 (setting price for gunpowder). Benjamin Franklin, while serving in Con-
gress, noted the distinction between "Vessels and Cargoes taken by the armed Vessels in
the Pay of the Continent and those taken by Individuals." Wilcox, ed, 22 Papers of Ben-
jamin Franklin at 230, 234 (Oct 21, 1775) (cited in note 65). The crew put aboard one of
Nathaniel Shaw's prizes signed the following statement:
We the Subscribers (Seamen on board the Sloop American Revenue) do acknowledge
to have Received of Nathaniel Shaw Junr the sum of One hundred Dollars each of us
which is in full of our prize Money & in full of our Wages on board the Guinea Ship
called the Mary... & taken by sd Sloop... & in full of all Demands on any prize
from sd Sloop this present Cruse.
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parties rather than the government was one of the allures of pri-
vateering, since it was more certain and more lucrative. State of-
ficials frowned on anyone remaining on the navy payroll while
also profiting from privateering and kept clear the distinction be-
tween government ships and private ones. °9 Owners also faced
the not insignificant cost of the bond."0 One set of privateer own-
ers, seeking an exemption from an embargo, pleaded that they
had "been at great panes and Expence in fitting sd. ship.""'
Failed or fatal privateer missions did not receive any compensa-
tion from Congress, such as the pension naval sailors received."'
Owners even had to pay the costs of caring for any prisoners
(sailors removed from prize ships) and delivering them to con-
gressional agents or to a jail."' States were also not above bor-
rowing money from merchants to finance government ships."'
D. Governmental Supervision of Privateers: The Prize Courts
Given their financial independence, it is no surprise that
privateers and letters of marque of the American Revolution
largely avoided governmental supervision. However, they often
faced real checks, but from the judiciary rather than from execu-
tive or legislative authorities. Focusing on the legitimacy of and
title to prizes, the prize courts served a dual function: they pro-
vided a governmental check on the privateers, but also secured
the privateers' income and financial independence.
The life of a privateer or letter of marque was one of "almost
total freedom.""5 The regulations".6 had little bite: commissions
were granted as a matter of course, usually immediately, al-
though the bond might take a bit longer." 7 Almost as easy to get
Quoted in McManemin, Sea Raiders Part One (Connecticut) at 23 (cited in note 102).
"See Jackson, Pennsylvania Navy at 300-01 (payroll overlap), 319 ("Council never
made the mistake of considering [merchant-owned ships] elements of the State navy.")
(cited in note 86).
"McManemin, Sea Raiders Part One (Pennsylvania) at 292 (cited in note 102)
(noting that bonds tended to go for $20,000). On bonds generally, see text accompanying
notes 34 and 42, and note 45.
.Quoted in Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 46 (cited in note 15).
..2 Maclay, History of Privateers at 22-23 (cited in note 7).
' Ford, ed, 16 Continental Congress at 408 (May 2, 1780) (cited in note 46); Ford, ed,
19 Continental Congress at 363 (Apr 7, 1781) (cited in note 47). It appears that states
sometimes reimbursed some of these expenses or at least had power to do so. See George
Mason to Thomas Jefferson (July 16, 1779), in Boyd, ed, 3 Papers of Thomas Jefferson at
37, 37 (cited in note 51) (suggesting Virginia pay a privateer's expenses in maintaining
prisoners on board since arriving in port).
.Jackson, Pennsylvania Navy at 307-08 (cited in note 86).
...Id at 13.
.See Part H.
11 Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 44 (cited in note 15).
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were exemptions from the repeated embargoes." s Privateer cap-
tains, once at sea, "were not bothered with any orders more lim-
iting than the roving commission,""9 which was broad indeed. A
typical one limited the privateer's range to nine degrees west
longitude on the east, twelve degrees north latitude on the south,
and "the Shoals of Nantucket" on the west, which amounts to
most of the North Atlantic.2 ' A slightly less confining example is
a successful petition for a commission "to cruise against the
Enemies of these united States."'2 '
Nevertheless, the prize courts, including the appeals court in
Congress, were a real check on privateers, often the only one. 22
They were also critical to the privateers: captors had no title to
captured property until a court granted it.123 The courts' job was
to "libel" prizes, which meant determining what counted as
"lawful prize" and whether the prize (in whole or in part) at issue
met those requirements. 24 Even with the fires of American patri-
otism and disdain for the British burning brightly, these courts
appear to have taken their role seriously and adjudicated
fairly. 12 For example, the treaty that ended the Revolutionary
"I Id at 45-47.
.. Howard, Seth Harding at 69 (cited in note 51).
.
2 Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 328 (cited in note 29).
"Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 44-45 (cited in note 15), quoting an April 13,
1778 petition of Daniel Martin.
' For the details on the Massachusetts courts, which were the first created and by far
the most active during the war, see Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 33 (cited in note
15). Massachusetts courts tried about 1,200 prizes during the war. Id at 53. For examples
illustrating the importance of prize courts, see id at 53-55 (reprinting trial transcript on
the Boston's capture of the Independence); Jackson, Pennsylvania Navy at 301-03 (cited in
note 86) (case of the Active).
'Privateers could often avoid the tedium of prize courts. "When no one was looking,
parts of cargoes could more readily be appropriated for private use" without awaiting ad-
judication. Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution at 147 (cited in note 29). The usual
way to do this was to seize the cargo while setting the prize ship free. See Faibisy, Priva-
teering and Piracy at 115 (cited in note 58).
"Ford, ed, 4 Continental Congress at 231 (cited in note 37) (Mar 23, 1776 resolution
establishing court); Morse, New England Privateering at 71 (cited in note 28) (noting that
this "law" was often "feeble" in practice); Miller v The Ship Resolution, 2 US (2 Dallas) 1,
1-3 (Fed Ct App 1781) (noting that its rulings were guided by laws of Congress "and,
where they are silent, by the laws, usage and practice of nations"; stating the issue of the
case as "whether... the ship or cargo, or both, or any part of the cargo, be a prize...";
and explaining that "[p]rize is generally used as a technical term to express a legal cap-
ture ....").
"Morse, New England Privateering at 72 (cited in note 28) (The courts "probably dis-
charged their functions with honesty and fairness."). One Massachusetts judge wrote
John Adams with the details of a case in which the judges refused to condemn the prize
(that is, refused to grant it to the captors). Apparently feeling some political pressure, he
commented that "I trouble you with this that the Congress or Pensilvanians [sic] may not
Suppose that Massachusetts is unwilling to Condemn prizes but I should wish the world
to know that we will not pervert Justice on any account." James Sullivan to John Adams
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War set a deadline after which no prize could be taken. Some
was, and courts ordered it all restored.'26
The perennial difficulty was protecting the property and
shipping of neutrals.'27 Early ambiguities in the definition of law-
ful prize caused many embarrassments, such as captures of
French and Swedish ships (both neutral countries at the time)
and the return of two British prizes upon heated British protest
against the use of French ports by American privateers at a time
when France's treaties with Britain prohibited such action." In
addition to these "just complaints" of foreign nations,'29 the priva-
teers were also unhappy, disliking the courts' evidentiary rules.'
Congressional resolutions in 1778, 1780, and 1781 all tried to
prevent these indelicacies.' 3' Violation of the rules of neutrality
could make one liable for damages plus interest, and if the viola-
tion were intentional and one were captured by the foreign na-
tion, he would receive no assistance from the United States, but
would suffer his fate alone.
132
Since prize cases determined title, often to huge sums of
money, the parties placed enormous importance on them. Politi-
cal connections, therefore, did not lack attention. For example,
Samuel Purviance was part owner of a privateer, whose captain
had sent "a Valuable Prize" to a port in New Hampshire but had
failed to put aboard it a copy of the privateer's commission and
other necessary papers. Anticipating "some difficulties" in con-
(Sept 22, 1776), in Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of John Adams 34, 35 (cited in note 53).
'Morse, New England Privateering at 528-29 (cited in note 28). For an example, see
the Salem Gazette's account (Apr 3, 1783) of the Brigantine Lively, quoted in Allen, Mas-
sachusetts Privateers at 210 (cited in note 15).
"See Miller, 2 US at 2 ("The rights of war can only take place among enemies, and
therefore, a capture can give no right, unless the property captured be the property of an
enemy."). A related problem was wrongful seizure of American ships. See McManemin,
Sea Raiders Part One (Connecticut) at 24-25 (cited in note 102) (recounting the capture of
the Sally by the American Revenue).
'See The Foreign Affairs Committee [Richard Henry Lee and James Lovell] to the
Commissioners (May 14, 1778), in Taylor, ed, 6 Papers of John Adams 116, 118 (cited in
note 66) (hoping that the treaty with France and recent proclamations on the rights of
neutrals would leave "the minds of the Seamen relieved thereby from that unexplainable
Mystery respecting their real prizes which before embarrassed them, that such irregu-
larities will be less frequent or totally cease"); id at 120 n 5 (noting some of the embar-
rassments and Congress's efforts to prevent their repetition). The intrepid Captain Gus-
tavus Conyngham was responsible for all four of the incidents mentioned in the text. Id at
120 n 5.
'Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 35 (cited in note 15).
'Morse, New England Privateering at 403 (cited in note 28).
"'Proclamation of May 9, 1778, reprinted in Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 36-37
(cited in note 15); Ford, ed, 16 Continental Congress at 403-09 (May 2, 1780) (cited in note
46); Ford, ed, 19 Continental Congress at 360-64 (Apr 7, 1781) (cited in note 47).
'"Proclamation of May 9, 1778, reprinted in Allen, Massachusetts Privateers at 36-37
(cited in note 15).
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demning the prize as a result, Purviance beseeched John Adams,
then a member of Congress. He had never met Adams, but his
brother had. Purviance hoped Adams might drop "a Line to some
of your Freinds [sic] at Boston" to help work things out."3
III. THE CURRENT MISUSE OF THE MARQUE AND
REPRISAL CLAUSE
The scholars who allege an analogy between letters of
marque and reprisal and modern forms of undeclared war over-
look both the true historical nature of the letters and the most
likely purpose of the Clause. The Clause makes most sense when
one views it as granting Congress power over the form of war
that it could not control through its power of the purse. In this
purpose lies any modern relevance of the Clause, yet all exam-
ples that modern scholars offer involve federal funding. This Part
first explains their errors of history and interpretation and then
proposes a more credible understanding of the Clause.
A. Two Errors of Recent Marque and Reprisal Clause
Scholarship
The scholars' first mistake is to assume that since people of
the eighteenth century used terms interchangeably, they also
used them to encompass numerous activities. The history belies
such an assumption. Although terms such as "letter of marque,"
"letter of marque and reprisal," and "private armed vessel" were
used "loosely" during the Revolution, " one must understand
"loosely" precisely. It means that people of that time used several
similar terms to refer to a commonly understood type of activity:
governmentally sanctioned seizure of foreign property by private
parties who received no government funding. It does not mean
that the terms were nebulous, enveloping every sort of unde-
clared war. Lobel displays this error when he treats letters of
marque as authorizing shipowners "to go out and fight the en-
emy," to fight "in place of or alongside public naval vessels," and
to engage in "hostilities" and use "force." 3' His language over-
Samuel Purviance, Jr., to John Adams (Sept 18, 1776), in Taylor, ed, 5 Papers of
John Adams at 31, 31-32 (cited in note 53). Benjamin Franklin, also in Congress, received
similar pleas. See Elizabeth Hubbart Partridge to Benjamin Franklin (Sept 17, 1776), in
Willcox, ed, 22 Papers of Benjamin Franklin at 610 (cited in note 65); id at 657-58
(testimony in prize case).
' See note 28.
'Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 67 (cited in note 3); Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1040,
1044, 1045 (cited in note 3). See text accompanying notes 22-24 for his emphasis on loose
terms at the Founding.
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looks how privateers fought the enemy and how often; whether
they even intended to fight; what sort of enemy they fought; how
well or poorly they functioned with or in place of true military
vessels; how, if at all, they were supervised; and, most impor-
tantly, how their voyages were funded. Only after skirting such
details can one declare that the Marque and Reprisal Clause
"unambiguously" covers all undeclared warfare." 6 As an effort at
historical induction, this lacks the precision that is necessary
given the shifting meaning of letters of marque and reprisal prior
to the Founding.3 '
Their second mistake, made possible by the unwarranted
generalization of the first, is to construe the Marque and
Reprisal Clause too broadly to include modern military incidents
that it cannot contain. For example, Lobel construes the Marque
and Reprisal Clause to apply to the CIA's covert wars, use of
"proxy" armies, and paramilitary operations, particularly actions
in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Cambodia under the Reagan
Doctrine. 8' Yet such an interpretation overlooks numerous cru-
cial differences from privateering. Those doing the CIA's fighting
were pursuing purely military goals-usually toppling Commu-
nist governments-rather than commercial ones. They actually
wanted to fight. Their skill at fighting greatly exceeded the pri-
vateers'. Federal funds, which the privateers never received,
were their life support. And federal officials supervised their ef-
forts." 9 These objections apply with even more force to fighting
by United States troops, as in Grenada and Panama.
'Ely, War and Responsibility at 74 (cited in note 22). Lofgren at least offered his
conclusion tentatively, even if those who rely on him do not. 81 Yale L J at 697 (cited in
note 9).
'A member of Congress in 1810 attacked the same error when he criticized his col-
league's sloppy appeal to the practice of the British Parliament: "It is well known that the
powers of the House of Commons have been very different at different times.... At which
of these periods does the gentleman apply the proceedings of the House of Commons as a
model for this House?" Speech of Rep Findley (Apr 3, 1810), in 21 Annals of the Congress
of the United States 1735 (Gales & Seaton 1853). On the changing meaning of letters of
marque and reprisal, see text accompanying notes 14-15.
'Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1049-52 (cited in note 3). See also id at 1084 (discussing
paramilitary operations in Guatemala, Cuba, and Nicaragua).
"Thus Lobel defines covert activity as including "financial support and assistance to
foreign political parties... and the direction of paramilitary operations designed to over-
throw or support a foreign regime." He emphasizes the CIA's role in "organiz[ing]" such
activities and notes President Reagan's goal of "underwriting anti-Communist insur-
gency." Id at 1049-51.
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B. The Marque and Reprisal Clause and Congress's Power
of the Purse
More generally, scholars overlook the key elements of letters
of marque and reprisal and thereby guarantee misinterpretation.
A careful analysis of the relevant history, combined with an ap-
preciation of the importance of Congress's power of the purse,
leads to the conclusion that the essential feature of letters of
marque and reprisal in the American Revolution was financial
independence: the income from seizure of prize (the overriding
goal), the lack of congressional funding, and the ability to win ti-
tle to the prize in the court proceedings.
Put differently, the power of the purse is Congress's chief
power over war, yet the power cannot control privateers and let-
ters of marque. The Marque and Reprisal Clause corrects this de-
ficiency. Its most likely purpose was to plug a hole in Congress's
power of the purse. This is a hole that does not exist in any of the
examples of modern military activities that scholars attempt to
fit under the Clause. The executive actions they decry often in-
volve modern-day mercenaries, yet such "contracting out" of war,
common in the eighteenth century,4 ' is not at all what letters of
marque and reprisal of the Revolution involved or what the
Clause was intended to address. Such contracts are not free for
the government; privateering is. Scholars increasingly acknowl-
edge the importance of Congress's power of the purse in war
powers,' although such awareness is hardly new. James Madi-
.See, for example, Ely, War and Responsibility at 74 (cited in note 22). See also
Stern and Halperin, Introduction, in Stern and Halperin, eds, Power to Go to War at 7
(cited in note 18) (The Marque and Reprisal Clause "is the historical antecedent to what
is now overt/covert lethal support of foreign military forces.") (emphasis added).
..The three most thorough recent examples are John Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 296-300,
303, 305 (cited in note 13); Peter Raven-Hansen and William C. Banks, From Vietnam to
Desert Shield: The Commander in Chiefs Spending Power, 81 Iowa L Rev 79 (1995); and
William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of the
Purse (Oxford 1994). See also, for example, Spiro, 37 Wm & Mary L Rev at 738 (cited in
note 1) ("The primary lever for the new congressional boldness is the appropriations
power."); Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343 (1988); J. Gregory Si-
dak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L J 1162; Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congres-
sional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 Yale J Intl L 69 (1988).
Even those who argue for congressional supremacy on grounds of the war power
clauses note the importance of the power of the purse. See, for example, Michael J. Glen-
non, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions,
60 Minn L Rev 1, 29 (1975) (noting that the Supreme Court has never struck down any
congressional restrictions on the executive branch through its power of the purse); Ely,
War and Responsibility at 198 n 56 ("mhe founders explicitly contemplated that wars
could be ended by congressional withdrawal of funding."), 29 (finding that the power of
the purse is inadequate for ending a war) (cited in note 22). Lobel argues that the power
of the purse is inadequate when the executive hides its activities from Congress, and that
cutting off funding is institutionally difficult for Congress. Lobel, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1079-
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son called the power of the purse the "most complete and effec-
tual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people," and credited the power with the
House of Commons's "continual triumph" over the monarchy. But
this mighty power evaporates if the President may act independ-
ently of legislative funds, as he could if he, like the British King,
issued letters of marque and reprisal. Were it not for the Marque
and Reprisal Clause, the power to issue the letters would likely
rest with the President alone, who could credibly invoke British
history to support his prerogative and who would have no need of
Congress's money. 43
One can thus answer Professor Lobel's reductio ad absur-
dum to those who would urge a limited "technical" reading of the
Clause. He asks: "Why would the framers give Congress power to
authorize minor uses of force by private parties, if they did not
also mean for Congress to have power to authorize major use of
American armed forces ... ?"' The answer is that, without ex-
plicit power over letters of marque and reprisal, Congress would
have no power over them, given privateers' financial independ-
ence. 45 But CIA covert activities do not raise this concern, espe-
cially given Lobers emphasis on the CIA's organizing and fund-
ing role. 4 ' Actions involving federally funded American forces,
such as the invasions of Grenada and Panama and the bombing
of Libya, no matter how "little" or brief, fall even farther from the
Clause.'47
If the Clause were to have any relevance to modern warfare,
it would have to be in areas where the President evades the
power of the purse, as he attempted to do in funding the Contras
and Operation Desert Shield." When the President finds ways to
80 & n 204 (cited in note 3). Yoo answers the latter point: "[A] failure of political will
should not be confused with a constitutional defect." Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 299 (cited in
note 13).
.. Federalist 58 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 356, 359 (cited in
note 27).
'"On Great Britain and the King, see Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional
Power at 6-10 (cited in note 22).
'"Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 70 (cited in note 3). This is question-begging of a high
order: while the Framers may have intended what Lobel argues regarding congressional
war power, this does not tell us which clause might grant such power.
"Congress could, of course, use indirect means to control this, such as restricting
funding in some other area.
'"See notes 138-39.
"These are three of Lobel's examples. Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 76 (cited in note
3).
14 While not invoking the Marque and Reprisal Clause, Congress clearly saw this
problem during the Iran-Contra affair: "By circumventing Congress's power of the purse
through third-country and private contributions to the Contras, the Administration un-
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fight wars without congressional money, leaving the power of the
purse powerless, the principle of the Marque and Reprisal Clause
is violated.' Were he to authorize a self-financed private party
to conduct hostilities on behalf of the United States, the Marque
and Reprisal Clause would protest even more, particularly if the
party somehow profited from the effort. 50
CONCLUSION
Modern scholars are demanding too much from the Marque
and Reprisal Clause. Their efforts to treat the Clause as encom-
passing all military actions short of declared war, and then to
join it with the Declare War Clause to require Congress to ap-
prove all presidential uses of force, are unwarranted at least to
the extent that they rely on the Marque and Reprisal Clause. The
historical arguments supporting their reading of the Clause's
original meaning are useful but inadequate since they ignore
practice in the American Revolution. Analysis of such practice
leads to a narrower reading of the Clause, one that emphasizes
the unique and pervasive financial aspects of letters of marque
and reprisal that allowed their holders to operate independently
of Congress's power of the purse. This historical view reveals the
Marque and Reprisal Clause to have no bearing on typical CIA
covert activity, much less the escapades of American troops.
dermined a cardinal principle of the Constitution." Report of the Congressional Commit-
tees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S Rep No 100-216, HR Rep No 100-433, 100th
Cong, 1st Sess 16 (1987). See also id at 413-14 (criticizing Oliver North's efforts to set up
a "nominally private entity" to filter funds for the Contras and avoid the appropriations
process). Allegations that the CIA entered the drug business to finance the Contras impli-
cate the same concerns. See Charles Lane, Just Say No, The New Republic 4, 4 (Nov 25,
1996) (discussing and dismissing such allegations).
Under a law allowing the executive to determine the use of "gifts" for national de-
fense, President Bush attempted to fund Desert Shield with billions of dollars donated by
foreign nations. Congress then restricted the use of these gifts, although it eventually
passed supplemental appropriations. See Raven-Hansen and Banks, 81 Iowa L Rev at 86-
92 (cited in note 141).
.Compare the similar sentiment of Raven-Hansen and Banks: "To the extent that
third-party funding affords the Commander in Chief the means to fund a military opera-
tion explicitly opposed by Congress, it undermines at least the spirit, if not the letter of
the Appropriations Clause." 81 Iowa L Rev at 134 (cited in note 141). While Raven-
Hansen and Banks accept Lofgren's and Lobel's view of the Marque and Reprisal Clause
and do not emphasize the link between the Clause and the power of the purse, they prop-
erly understand Congress's Boland amendments of the 1980s, restricting funding for the
Contras, as "premised on the same structural allocation of power" as the Marque and Re-
prisal Clause. Banks and Raven-Hansen, National Security Law at 151 (cited in note
141).
'A privately funded airlift into hostile territory would be an example, particularly if
those conducting it funded their mission with sales from the airlift. For a similar exam-
ple, see Raven-Hansen and Banks, 81 Iowa L Rev at 100-01 & n 140 (cited in note 141).
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